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TOLERANCE:

Should We

Approve of It,

Put Up with It,
or

Tolerate It ?
By Barry Schwartz

GOOD LIBERALS IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY-

a closer look at what tolerance actually is. The diction

to tolerate is "to allow what is not actually app
and especially as citizens of that bastion that
of liber-

whenWe
we say we tolerate something, we are implying
alism, the academy - we value tolerance.
try to instill tolerance in our students
judgment
as we about it. We are saying, in effect, that we wi

there,
but for one reason or another we aren't prepared
teach them to respect differences among
people

thing
to stop it. This understanding of tolerance may c
and among groups. We try to practice
it our-

somewhat
less favorable light, because at the same ti
selves. And we reserve our strongest condemnation for
individuals

are that
allowing
something to occur, we are being judgm
or institutions that are intolerant. We deeply believe
toler-

ance is the one virtue of character on which a liberal,
are being
pluralistic
disapproving. Is this what we mean to say wh

that we tolerate
society most depends. Liberal society can survive dishonesty.
It different lifestyles, different family arr
andencourage)
different religious beliefs and practices - that they
can survive disloyalty. It can survive (and may even
selfishness. But it can't survive intolerance. Indeed, as
good
philosopher
as ours, but they aren't so bad that we should expe
ergy invented
to stop them?
John Rawls has suggested, liberal society may even have
I don't think
tolerance as a practical feature of social life. Before pluralistic,
lib- so. I think that most of the time what

mindof
when
we speak of tolerance is something closer
eral societies demonstrated that the successful practice
toler-

tance," or even "celebration." Acceptance implies app
ance was possible, it was "natural to believe, as the centuries-long

celebration
implies enthusiastic approval. This is closer
practice of intolerance appeared to confirm, that social
unity and
have in mind
concord requires agreement on a general and comprehensive
reli- when we teach our students to be toleran

just asbetter,
good as we are, only different" is what we wan
gious, philosophical, or moral doctrine." We now know
dents
learn.
and we can be proud of our collective tolerance. It may
be to
liberalism's finest achievement.
Perhaps to say that tolerance implies either disappro

one
hand,
or acceptance on the other, is an overstatem
Before we get too proud, however, it may be a good
idea
to take

haps tolerance implies little more than indifference (

more"
thanand
indifference because when one is truly i
Barry Schwartz is the Dorwin P. Cartwright Professor of Social
Theory

about
Social Action in the psychology department at Swarthmore College.

something, the issue of tolerance doesn't even
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Before pluralistic, liberal societies demon-

strated that the suc-

cessful practice of
tolerance was possible,
it was "natural to

As good liberals in a
liberal society - and
especially as citizens

believe, as the
centuries-long practice
of intolerance appeared
to confirm, that social
unity and concord
requires agreement
on a general and
comprehensive reli-

of that bastion of

liberalism, the
academy- -we value

tolerance.

gious, philosophical, or
moral doctrine."

order for tolerance to be relevant, one must at

are a matter of moral principle. To "put up wit

least find what is being tolerated relevant to one's

anti-abortionists in the way I put up with count
music is to obliterate this distinction between ma

life in some way). Thus I tolerate people who op-

pose abortion just as I tolerate people who sing

ters of taste and matters of principle. And to "

the praises of country music (which I can't bear).

cept" anti-abortionists is to deny that I deeply d

In this view, to tolerate is to put up with, and

approve of that position. To treat tolerance as t

while that might imply distaste, it implies neither

equivalent of putting up with is to ignore the d
tinction between morally significant and moral

The dictionary
tells us
approval nor disapproval. However, tolerance
as

that to tolerate is "to
allow what is not actu-

"putting up with" is not adequate. It is extremely

insignificant differences. And to treat tolerance

important for us to preserve a notion of tolerance

the equivalent of acceptance is to ignore the diffe

ally approved."

that is neither "putting up with," which demands

ence between agreement and disagreement. Thu

too little of us, nor "acceptance," which demands

as philosopher Hans Oberdeik has suggested, tole

too much.

ance is required when there is deep diversity of beliefs, prac

religious
The examples of attitudes toward abortion and country
music commitments, and even entire ways of life, and
people actually disapprove of the beliefs, practices, reli
can help show why the distinctions between tolerance,some
putting
beliefs,
up with, and acceptance should be preserved. It is easy to
imag-and ways of life of others. Note what this requireme

disapproval
implies: that we believe that some person or g
ine that while I simply dislike country music, I disapprove
of
beliefs
views that oppose legalized abortion. It doesn't require has
much
to or practices that are incompatible with ours and u
ceptable.
live with things one merely dislikes. I might avoid contact
with That is, we believe that this person or group wou
notably
country music as much as I can, but the- fact that other
peopleimproved if it adopted our beliefs and practices. N
theless,
we restrain ourselves from acting on our own belie
seek it out and like it is of no real consequence to me. It
does no
that the "offending" person or group can continue to ac
violence to any of my core beliefs or ethical commitments.
theirs.
The beliefs and actions of committed anti-abortion
"Putting up with" country music is good enough; nothing
more

challenge
is needed. Anti-abortion beliefs are another story. I don't
regard us to be tolerant precisely because we find them re

nantthey
and deplorable.
attitudes toward legalized abortion as a mere matter of taste;
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This characterization of tolerance makes it seem challenging

neither to accept it nor merely to put up with it. People put up

enough that one might ask if it's worth it. Why tolerate beliefs,
practices, and ways of life that one judges to be morally unaccept-

with things when they really don't care much about them, and
they accept things when they agree with them. In contrast, when

able? Why not make it as hard as possible for anti-abortionists

people tolerate things, they permit them to occur even though they

to exhort others to share their views, especially when they show

do care about them and they disagree. Thus, people can accept, or

so little tolerance themselves for people whose views they find

perhaps celebrate, that (some) anti-abortionists are deeply commit-

objectionable?
Today, when any discussion of values is treated with suspicion,

ted to the doctrine of universal love, and people can put up with

it is tempting to answer this question by appealing to relativism or

must tolerate their stance on abortion. And tolerance is good and

skepticism. The reason to tolerate the beliefs and practices of oth-

important not because of skepticism about human values, but be-

their observance of Christmas as a national holiday. But people

ers is that there is no right or wrong (relativism), or if there is one,

cause of a positive conception we have of how people should live

there is no way to know what it is (skepticism). If people actually

and what they need to flourish. If we are going to be serious about

believed this, they would have to tolerate anti-abortionists be-

a commitment to autonomy and social connectedness, we have no

cause they would either have no grounds at all for criticizing that

choice but to disagree with things and to tolerate them.

position/ or their grounds would be nothing more than personal

preference ("I think abortion should be legal, don't you?"). A
skeptical defense of tolerance is essentially a negative defense; peo-

Tolerance and Critical Engagement

ple tolerate others only because they have no grounds for being intolerant. Among its problems, it is hard to know how from a skep-

tical point of view tolerance itself co\x\A. be justified as a worthy
stance to take toward other

CAN ONLY TOLERATE THINGS OF WHICH THEY

PEOPLE disapprove. Indeed, "disapprove" may be too mild. People

may be disgusted by and disdainful of practices they tolerate.

They may despise them. Yet,

people.
A more compelling and pos-

they tolerate them, because they

acknowledge and respect the

itive defense of tolerance is

importance of these practices to

available, deriving from the

the way of life of the people who

engage in them, and because

writings of John Stuart Mill in

the last century and amplified by Joseph Raz in

they respect that way of life, as a morally informed

the current one. Mill justifies tolerance by ap-

way of life, even if it's not informed by the morality

pealing to the view that people should have au-

they favor.

tonomy to be the authors of their own lives. It is

So if people tolerate a practice or a way of life,

good and important that people should find their

what then do they do about it? They surely can't em-

own way to the best way of life. Tolerance en-

brace it, for to embrace it would be to accept it, and

courages people to find their own way, though it

they don't accept it. But they also can't ignore it, for

obviously leaves open the real possibility that

to ignore something that is of central importance to

they will fail. The importance of autonomy must

someone else is demeaning and disrespectful. What's

be elaborated by two additional points. First,

left is to criticize it. To criticize a practice or a way of

there are many distinctive, worthwhile, yet in-

life is simultaneously to acknowledge its importance

compatible ways to live. These alternatives are

and its unacceptability. To do any less is to fail to

much more than mere matters of taste; they are

take the practice and the people who engage in it se-

morally significant and engender deep commitments, and even sacrifices, on the part of their

life of which we disapprove is through active critical

practitioners. And second, no person is an island.

engagement. But note what kind of society this "re-

riously. The only way to show respect for a way of

Acknowledging that people are autonomous does

spect" produces: an interactive, conflictive, "judg-

not mean that they can live apart from a meaningful community. Thus, to enable individuals toTolerance as "putting
up with," is not adebe the authors of their own lives requires that we
quate. It is extremely
tolerate groups they can join whose beliefs and
important for us to
practices they find compelling. If we believe that
preserve a notion of
people should be the authors of their own lives,
tolerance that is

mental" society. And note the problems it creates for
those who strive to be tolerant and for those who are

being tolerated. The tolerated face being told that
their way of life is defective in a significant way. This

is not an easy thing to have to hear. And the tolerant

are forced to support something with which they

that people depend on membership in moral
neither "putting up
communities to live fully human lives, and that
with," which demands
too little of us, nor
incompatible, worthwhile ways of life are possi"acceptance," which
ble, then it is our duty to be tolerant. Thus, we

strongly disagree, out of respect for its importance to

must acknowledge that a commitment to oppose

concrete examples. Suppose you think that a
monogamous relationship organized around the

demands too much.

legal abortion that stems from, say, certain reli-

other people who are struggling to be the authors of
their own lives.

To appreciate how hard this is, think about some

bearing and nurturing of children should be a part
gious views, is a morally significant and worthof a fulfilled human life. Tolerance now demands that you conwhile commitment, even if it includes beliefs and practices, like
front and criticize your friends who are single or childless by
opposition to legal abortion, that we find unacceptable.

choice. Suppose you think that while homosexuality is not an
To summarize the argument thus far, to tolerate something is
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abomination, it isn't important enough in the grand scheme of

Nevertheless, I think that open critical engagement is what re-

things to become1 the central part of a person's identity. Tolerance now demands that you confront your gay friends and tell

spect for difference demands.

them, at the very least, that they are making too much of their

created by the atmosphere of political correctness that dominates

Putting up with masquerading as approval is the real problem

sexual orientation. Tolerance similarly demands
that you tell your black friends that their separatism is destructive and their Afrocentric view of

history is a fiction (if that's what you believe),
that you tell your Catholic friends that their position on abortion is wrong, and that you tell orthodox Jews that their treatment of women is
abhorrent.

This kind of critical engagement is not what or-

dinarily comes to mind when people think about
tolerance; people typically think that tolerance demands that they not be judgmental. I am suggesting that the opposite is true. This understanding
of tolerance hardly conjures up an image of a
world that is peaceful and harmonious. If this is
what tolerance demands, who wants it?

many of our social institutions - especially univer-

Putting up with masquerading as approval
is the real problem created by the atmosphere
of political correctness
that dominates many of

our social institutions -

especially universities - these days.

One answer to this question that has become increasingly clear is that minority groups don't want

it. It may once have been good enough for these
groups to be tolerated. But nowadays, tolerance has \
become intolerable. What these groups now demand is not tolerance but acceptance - célébra- ;
tion. "Who are you to 'tolerate' me? Who are you ;

sities - these days. Political correctness produces
silence in the face of disagreement. Because the
stance of the institution may be approval rather
than tolerance, the silence of the members who
comprise the institution is often interpreted as ap-

proval as well. But it isn't, at least not always, and

while all may appear harmonious on the surface,
deep disagreements simmer beneath it. And efforts
by institutions to curb the way members of differ-

ent groups talk to and about one another only fur-

ther encourage the silence. There is a double irony
in this institutionally enforced silence. First, the
norms and rules that are promulgated by these in-

stitutions are usually promulgated in the name of

"respect for difference," but what they actually
produce is the disrespect that putting up with im-

plies. Second, the institutions that promulgate respect for difference characteristically also encour-

age their members to seek a multicultural
education- - to come to know deeply, and thus ap-

preciate, the way different people live. But in an
atmosphere of enforced silence, multicultural edu-

to say that my way of life is inferior to yours? Who ;

cation seems pointless. If students were taught that

are you to judge?" We can hear these sentences <
even as we imagine suggesting to someone whose j

the way to show respect is through critical engagement, and that critical engagement requires know-

practices we tolerate that he or she should be living ;

ing other ways of life deeply, they might actually

differently. Fifty years ago, perhaps, when the pos- ;

approach multicultural education with some en-

sibilities for Jews in America were tolerance (not ■

thusiasm. And who knows? Perhaps as people

tolerance really, but putting up with) or intoler- ;
ance, tolerance was plenty good
enough. "You don't have to approve of us or even respect us.
Just leave us alone, let us use a

learned about another way of life, with the objec-

tive of criticizing it, their
growing understanding might
turn tolerance into acceptance
or celebration.

little corner of your field, and

If the way to show respect for

people with whom one dis-

we'll stay out of your way. Even

if you don't let us into your

agrees is by expressing that dis-

prestigious universities and professional schools, as long as you
don't bother us, we'll make do." But now? Imagine the anger that
would rise up if someone were to tell you that your dietary prac-

agreement, why not urge society in a direction that dispenses with

politeness and encourages truly tolerant people to say what's on
their minds? What's the harm? The harm, alas, is substantial. As

tices were silly superstitions, your God was vengeful, and your re-

philosopher Charles Taylor has pointed out, human beings need

fusal to accept Jesus Christ would damn you to hell. Could you

to establish identity, an understanding of who they are - of their

tolerate being tolerated in this way?

So minority groups now demand approval, but that isn't what
they get. What they get instead is putting up with. This is not al-

fundamental characteristics as human beings. And this identity
will almost always include their membership in groups - in moral
communities. But what this need for identity requires is recogni-

ways easy to spot. Behaviorally, these groups get silence, which

tion by others. And so "a person or a group of people can suffer

can easily be interpreted as (tacit) approval. And perhaps some-

real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them

times silence is approval, but I think most of the time it is merely

mirror back to them a confining, or demeaning, or contemptible

politeness, a thin veneer that covers over deep disagreements
about how life should be lived - a veneer that slips away when
members of the group in question aren't around. This silent
putting up with is unacceptable because it is dishonest, disre-

picture of themselves... misrecognition shows not just a lack of due

respect. It can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with

a crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy we

owe people. It is a vital human need." Because of this, the de-

spectful, and patronizing. It is hard to get used to the idea that the

mands of tolerance put people squarely on the horns of a

way to show respect for someone's way of life is not by being
silent, but by telling that person why you find it unacceptable.

dilemma. To be silent - to put up with while pretending to approve - is to fail to give "due recognition." But to criticize can
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present people a "demeaning, contemptible picture of them-

selves." What are we to do?

Tolerance and Putting Up With
BRINGS US BACK TO THE DISTINCTION BE-

While it would be nice to find some way to avoid this kind of
conflictive social engagement, perhaps by replacing tolerance with

tween tolerance and putting up with. H

approval, it is simply not possible. It is simply not possible for me

tinction matter? Often, it's just a matter

to approve of committed anti-abortionists demonstrating outside

erance implies an appreciation of the value

abortion clinics. And it is simply not possible for me to approve of

the importance of some practice to that aut

^Jews who won't allow women to see, let alone read from the
Torah. In a pluralistic society and a pluralistic age, deep differ-

with does neither. But it isn't always just a ma

ences in the moral commitments of different groups of people are

a heavy metal rock musician by not getting in

unavoidable. Unless we are prepared to abandon pluralism, we are
stuck with tolerance.

separatists on campus by leaving them alone

example, parents put up with their adolescent

tolerate it by helping it to happen. A college

who harass them. It tolerates the

them a place to meet as an organiza

WEESSrSmSmmmlEk
The Drama of Diversity and Democracy:
Higher Education and American Commitments
This report calls on higher education to provide public leadership
in examining the connections between diversity issues and the
unfinished work of building a successful and inclusive democracy.

Higher education leaders are urged to help both campuses and
communities develop a fuller historical knowledge of the devel'
opment of democratic ideas and values in relation to diversity.
Recommended for trustees, general readers, and campus groups.
78 pages.

viding special services in the dean
giving them a budget for group a

by developing courses that speak to

ular concerns. Neither parents wi
their child's musical preferences
with regard to black separatists ne

of the practices to devote resources

they need to do is acknowledge th

of the practices to people who ar

way of life that is worthy of respec

Why on earth, in the name of

should we feel an obligation not jus

ourselves from interfering with
which we disapprove, but to act i

Liberal Learning and the Arts of Connection
for the New Academy

ples but on practicality. In a world

The liberal arts of the future will include ways of relating and

cally unequal power and control of

facilitates it? The answer is based n

learning across difference, this report argues. A "new academy"

sources, doing nothing to get in t

is growing up within the old, including such programs as women's

better than putting up with; it is
good enough. Groups that lack r

studies, ethnic; studies, environmental studies, peace studies, and
continuing education. The report is written for faculty members

not be able to sustain themselves an

working on diversity in the curriculum and classroom.

Curriculum committees should use this report in connection
with American Pluralism and the College Curriculum. 60 pages.

American Pluralism and the College Curriculum:
Higher Education in a Diverse Democracy
This report makes specific recommendations for teaching diversity across the curriculum in both general education and major
programs. Recommendations connect diversity with the study of
both self and society, including the values of a democratic society. It describes diversity courses and requirements in a broad

range of institutions. Recommended reading for curriculum and

general education committees and departmental committees
responsible for undergraduate studies. 66 pages.

tices without our help. If we thin
these groups want to do is not re
significant - to be put up with, th
than tolerated - then we owe the
And, of course, if we think what
want to do is morally significant b

ble, then we surely owe them not

perhaps every effort on our part to

way. But if we think that the aims

are morally significant and tolera

the service of autonomy, authorshi

nition, we should help them do wh

to do at the same time that we try
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